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Aggressive Oil Extraction and Precautionary 





The effects of stochastic oil demand on optimal oil extraction paths and tax, spending and 
government debt policies are analyzed when the oil demand schedule is linear and preferences 
quadratic. Without prudence, optimal oil extraction is governed by the Hotelling rule and 
optimal budgetary policies by the tax and consumption smoothing principle. Volatile oil 
demand brings forward oil extraction and induces a bigger government surplus. With 
prudence, the government depletes oil reserves even more aggressively and engages in 
additional precautionary saving financed by postponing spending and bringing taxes forward, 
especially if it has substantial monopoly power on the oil market, gives high priority to the 
public spending target, is very prudent, and future oil demand has high variance. Uncertain 
economic prospects induce even higher precautionary saving and, if non‐oil revenue shocks 
and oil revenue shocks are positively correlated, even more aggressive oil extraction. In 
contrast, prudent governments deliberately underestimate oil reserves which induce less 
aggressive oil depletion and less government saving, but less so if uncertainty about reserves 
and oil demand are positively correlated. 
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period must cover this deficit,  222 , TRGr BB +−−= so that the government’s intertemporal budget 
constraint is given by: 
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12 Oil demand shocks translate into oil price shocks, especially if oil demand is less 
sensitive to the oil price (low γ). Oil reserves are exogenous and given by  0 N > . We abstract from oil 
storage. Oil extraction rates must be non‐negative and satisfy the oil depletion equation: 
(4)       121 2 0, 0, . NNN N N ≥≥+ =  
Abstracting from private asset accumulation, we assume that private consumption in each period equals 
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We will assume that the set of parameter values is chosen in such a way that the optimum corresponds 
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The first‐order optimality condition for the future tax rate is given by: 
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Using (16′), the optimality conditions for the tax rate, deficit and oil extraction in period are written as: 
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The positive parameter θ  equals the coefficient of absolute prudence  22 V"'( )/V"( ) 0. UU θ − =>
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For this particular specification, the prudence parameter θ happens to coincide with the constant 
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equivalent value of expected welfare to go. The term  ( ) 22 2/ P N γ γη −− implies that the government 
has fewer funds to boost private and public consumption and therefore welfare to go will be lower. The 
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The stochastic term on the revenue side of the second‐period government budget constraint is given by: 
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where the flow government budget constraints are now given by 
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Hence, the interest and principal on the sovereign wealth accumulated during the oil boom of the first 
two periods sustain the boost to private and public consumption in the post‐oil era of period three.  CESifo Working Paper Series 
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